| rakuten.co.jp | primaryReviewed 2026-10-18 | DomainSpoof directory (curated) | reject | Direct | ~all · 2/10 lookups | Aggregate reports requested (rua) | Not checked | Unknown (no known selector) | Not checkedNot checked | 2026-10-18 22:58 UTC |
Records and check detailsPublished records- DMARC (_dmarc.rakuten.co.jp)
- v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:…@rx.rakuten.co.jp
- SPF (rakuten.co.jp)
- v=spf1 include:spf01.rakuten.co.jp include:spf02.rakuten.co.jp ~all
- MX (rakuten.co.jp)
- Not checked
- DKIM
- Unknown (no known selector). DKIM use requires a known selector or message to assess; a published key alone cannot confirm signing, and no key at the probed common selectors proves nothing.
- MTA-STS (_mta-sts.rakuten.co.jp)
- Not checked
- TLS-RPT (_smtp._tls.rakuten.co.jp)
- Not checked
Interpretation- p=reject: receivers are asked to reject failing mail.
- Relaxed DKIM alignment (default).
- Relaxed SPF alignment (default).
- ~all (softfail): unlisted hosts are marked suspicious; this is not +all and does not by itself bypass DMARC.
- 2 DNS-querying terms (include, a, mx, ptr, exists, redirect), counted recursively; the limit is 10.
- Static check of the published record: syntax, every referenced include/redirect record, the DNS-lookup count and a/mx/exists targets (resolved to count void lookups). It does not evaluate SPF for any particular sending host.
DMARC discovery (RFC 9989 tree walk)- _dmarc.rakuten.co.jp: ok, 1 DMARC record
Recent checks- 2026-10-18 22:58 UTC: DMARC reject; SPF ~all
Assessment posture-v2. DNS lookup failures leave the policy unknown. |
| rakuten-bank.co.jp | subsidiaryReviewed 2026-10-18 | DomainSpoof directory (curated) | quarantine | Direct | Could not fully evaluate (sender-specific macros) | Aggregate reports requested (rua) | Not checked | Unknown (no known selector) | Not checkedNot checked | 2026-10-18 22:58 UTC |
Records and check detailsPublished records- DMARC (_dmarc.rakuten-bank.co.jp)
- v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:…@mpub.ne.jp,mailto:…@rx.rakuten.co.jp
- SPF (rakuten-bank.co.jp)
- v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf02.rakuten.co.jp +ip4:220.213.233.48/30 +ip4:211.128.109.64/26 +ip4:211.130.191.128/25 +ip4:211.128.110.192/27 +ip4:219.99.189.128/27 +ip4:220.213.225.0/24 +ip4:219.99.179.64/26 include:spf-bma.mpme.jp include:axol.jp include:spf.humanage.co.jp include:_spf.salesforce.com -all
- MX (rakuten-bank.co.jp)
- Not checked
- DKIM
- Unknown (no known selector). DKIM use requires a known selector or message to assess; a published key alone cannot confirm signing, and no key at the probed common selectors proves nothing.
- MTA-STS (_mta-sts.rakuten-bank.co.jp)
- Not checked
- TLS-RPT (_smtp._tls.rakuten-bank.co.jp)
- Not checked
Interpretation- p=quarantine: receivers are asked to treat failing mail as suspicious.
- Relaxed DKIM alignment (default).
- Relaxed SPF alignment (default).
- Could not fully evaluate: the record uses sender-specific macros (for example %{i}) whose targets depend on each sending host, so a static check cannot evaluate them and this is not reported as a valid record.
- -all: unlisted hosts fail SPF.
- At least 8 DNS-querying terms (include, a, mx, ptr, exists, redirect), counted recursively; the limit is 10.
Observations- SPF (sender-specific): _spf.salesforce.com: exists:%{i}._spf.mta.salesforce.com uses a sender-dependent macro
DMARC discovery (RFC 9989 tree walk)- _dmarc.rakuten-bank.co.jp: ok, 1 DMARC record
Recent checks- 2026-10-18 22:58 UTC: DMARC quarantine; SPF could not fully evaluate
Assessment posture-v2. DNS lookup failures leave the policy unknown. |
| rakuten-card.co.jp | subsidiaryReviewed 2026-10-18 | DomainSpoof directory (curated) | reject | Direct | ~all · 4/10 lookups | Aggregate reports requested (rua) | Not checked | Unknown (no known selector) | Not checkedNot checked | 2026-10-18 22:58 UTC |
Records and check detailsPublished records- DMARC (_dmarc.rakuten-card.co.jp)
- v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:…@rx.rakuten.co.jp
- SPF (rakuten-card.co.jp)
- v=spf1 include:spf-bma.mpme.jp include:spf01.rakuten-card.co.jp include:spf02.rakuten-card.co.jp include:spf03.rakuten-card.co.jp ~all
- MX (rakuten-card.co.jp)
- Not checked
- DKIM
- Unknown (no known selector). DKIM use requires a known selector or message to assess; a published key alone cannot confirm signing, and no key at the probed common selectors proves nothing.
- MTA-STS (_mta-sts.rakuten-card.co.jp)
- Not checked
- TLS-RPT (_smtp._tls.rakuten-card.co.jp)
- Not checked
Interpretation- p=reject: receivers are asked to reject failing mail.
- Relaxed DKIM alignment (default).
- Relaxed SPF alignment (default).
- ~all (softfail): unlisted hosts are marked suspicious; this is not +all and does not by itself bypass DMARC.
- 4 DNS-querying terms (include, a, mx, ptr, exists, redirect), counted recursively; the limit is 10.
- Static check of the published record: syntax, every referenced include/redirect record, the DNS-lookup count and a/mx/exists targets (resolved to count void lookups). It does not evaluate SPF for any particular sending host.
DMARC discovery (RFC 9989 tree walk)- _dmarc.rakuten-card.co.jp: ok, 1 DMARC record
Recent checks- 2026-10-18 22:58 UTC: DMARC reject; SPF ~all
Assessment posture-v2. DNS lookup failures leave the policy unknown. |
| rakuten.com | subsidiaryReviewed 2026-10-18 | DomainSpoof directory (curated) | reject | Direct | ~all · 6/10 lookups | Aggregate reports requested (rua) | Not checked | Unknown (no known selector) | Not checkedNot checked | 2026-10-18 22:58 UTC |
Records and check detailsPublished records- DMARC (_dmarc.rakuten.com)
- v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:…@rx.rakuten.co.jp
- SPF (rakuten.com)
- v=spf1 include:spf01.rakuten.co.jp include:spf02.rakuten.co.jp include:spf03.rakuten.co.jp include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_spf.activegate-ss.jp include:spf.mta.hdems.com ~all
- MX (rakuten.com)
- Not checked
- DKIM
- Unknown (no known selector). DKIM use requires a known selector or message to assess; a published key alone cannot confirm signing, and no key at the probed common selectors proves nothing.
- MTA-STS (_mta-sts.rakuten.com)
- Not checked
- TLS-RPT (_smtp._tls.rakuten.com)
- Not checked
Interpretation- p=reject: receivers are asked to reject failing mail.
- Relaxed DKIM alignment (default).
- Relaxed SPF alignment (default).
- ~all (softfail): unlisted hosts are marked suspicious; this is not +all and does not by itself bypass DMARC.
- 6 DNS-querying terms (include, a, mx, ptr, exists, redirect), counted recursively; the limit is 10.
- Static check of the published record: syntax, every referenced include/redirect record, the DNS-lookup count and a/mx/exists targets (resolved to count void lookups). It does not evaluate SPF for any particular sending host.
DMARC discovery (RFC 9989 tree walk)- _dmarc.rakuten.com: ok, 1 DMARC record
Recent checks- 2026-10-18 22:58 UTC: DMARC reject; SPF ~all
Assessment posture-v2. DNS lookup failures leave the policy unknown. |