| meta.com | primaryReviewed — | Portfolio directory (wikidata_cik) | reject | Direct | -all · 5/10 lookups | Aggregate reports requested (rua) | Receives mail (4 MX hosts) | Unknown (no key at common selectors) | No MTA-STSNo TLS-RPT | 2026-10-19 10:41 UTC |
Records and check detailsPublished records- DMARC (_dmarc.meta.com)
- v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:…@dmarc.facebookmail.com
- SPF (meta.com)
- v=spf1 redirect=_spf.fb.com
- MX (meta.com)
- 10 mxa-00082601.gslb.pphosted.com · 10 mxb-00082601.gslb.pphosted.com · 20 mx0a-00082601.pphosted.com · 20 mx0b-00082601.pphosted.com
- DKIM
- Unknown (no key at common selectors). DKIM use requires a known selector or message to assess; a published key alone cannot confirm signing, and no key at the probed common selectors proves nothing.
- MTA-STS (_mta-sts.meta.com)
- No MTA-STS
- TLS-RPT (_smtp._tls.meta.com)
- No TLS-RPT
Interpretation- p=reject: receivers are asked to reject failing mail.
- Relaxed DKIM alignment (default).
- Relaxed SPF alignment (default).
- pct=100 is a legacy tag removed by RFC 9989; its effect is receiver-dependent.
- -all: unlisted hosts fail SPF.
- 5 DNS-querying terms (include, a, mx, ptr, exists, redirect), counted recursively; the limit is 10.
- Static check of the published record: syntax, every referenced include/redirect record, the DNS-lookup count and a/mx/exists targets (resolved to count void lookups). It does not evaluate SPF for any particular sending host.
- Receives mail (4 MX hosts).
- No usable DKIM key at the 28 common selectors probed. DKIM may use other selectors, so this proves nothing about DKIM use.
- No MTA-STS record (_mta-sts TXT).
- No TLS-RPT record: no address for SMTP TLS failure reports, a visibility gap rather than an enforcement setting.
Observations- Reporting: external destination dmarc.facebookmail.com does not publish report authorization; this affects reporting, not enforcement.
DMARC discovery (RFC 9989 tree walk)- _dmarc.meta.com: ok, 1 DMARC record
Recent checks- 2026-10-19 10:41 UTC: DMARC reject; SPF -all; 4 MX hosts; no MTA-STS
- 2026-10-18 22:03 UTC: DMARC reject; SPF -all
Assessment posture-v3. DNS lookup failures leave the policy unknown. |
| facebook.com | primaryReviewed 2026-10-18 | DomainSpoof directory (seed) | reject | Direct | -all · 1/10 lookups | Aggregate reports requested (rua) | Not checked | Unknown (no known selector) | Not checkedNot checked | 2026-10-18 22:03 UTC |
Records and check detailsPublished records- DMARC (_dmarc.facebook.com)
- v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:…@dmarc.facebookmail.com; pct=100
- SPF (facebook.com)
- v=spf1 redirect=_spf.facebook.com
- MX (facebook.com)
- Not checked
- DKIM
- Unknown (no known selector). DKIM use requires a known selector or message to assess; a published key alone cannot confirm signing, and no key at the probed common selectors proves nothing.
- MTA-STS (_mta-sts.facebook.com)
- Not checked
- TLS-RPT (_smtp._tls.facebook.com)
- Not checked
Interpretation- p=reject: receivers are asked to reject failing mail.
- Relaxed DKIM alignment (default).
- Relaxed SPF alignment (default).
- pct=100 is a legacy tag removed by RFC 9989; its effect is receiver-dependent.
- -all: unlisted hosts fail SPF.
- 1 DNS-querying term (include, a, mx, ptr, exists, redirect), counted recursively; the limit is 10.
- Checked with an earlier assessment that did not validate IP mechanism syntax or resolve a/mx/exists targets; it is re-assessed on the next check.
Observations- Reporting: external destination dmarc.facebookmail.com does not publish report authorization; this affects reporting, not enforcement.
DMARC discovery (RFC 9989 tree walk)- _dmarc.facebook.com: ok, 1 DMARC record
Recent checks- 2026-10-18 22:03 UTC: DMARC reject; SPF -all
Assessment posture-v1. DNS lookup failures leave the policy unknown. |
| fb.com | subsidiaryReviewed 2026-10-18 | DomainSpoof directory (seed) | reject | Direct | -all · 5/10 lookups | Aggregate reports requested (rua) | Not checked | Unknown (no known selector) | Not checkedNot checked | 2026-10-18 22:03 UTC |
Records and check detailsPublished records- DMARC (_dmarc.fb.com)
- v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:…@dmarc.facebookmail.com
- SPF (fb.com)
- v=spf1 redirect=_spf.fb.com
- MX (fb.com)
- Not checked
- DKIM
- Unknown (no known selector). DKIM use requires a known selector or message to assess; a published key alone cannot confirm signing, and no key at the probed common selectors proves nothing.
- MTA-STS (_mta-sts.fb.com)
- Not checked
- TLS-RPT (_smtp._tls.fb.com)
- Not checked
Interpretation- p=reject: receivers are asked to reject failing mail.
- Relaxed DKIM alignment (default).
- Relaxed SPF alignment (default).
- pct=100 is a legacy tag removed by RFC 9989; its effect is receiver-dependent.
- -all: unlisted hosts fail SPF.
- 5 DNS-querying terms (include, a, mx, ptr, exists, redirect), counted recursively; the limit is 10.
- Checked with an earlier assessment that did not validate IP mechanism syntax or resolve a/mx/exists targets; it is re-assessed on the next check.
Observations- Reporting: external destination dmarc.facebookmail.com does not publish report authorization; this affects reporting, not enforcement.
DMARC discovery (RFC 9989 tree walk)- _dmarc.fb.com: ok, 1 DMARC record
Recent checks- 2026-10-18 22:03 UTC: DMARC reject; SPF -all
Assessment posture-v1. DNS lookup failures leave the policy unknown. |
| instagram.com | subsidiaryReviewed 2026-10-18 | DomainSpoof directory (seed) | reject | Direct | -all · 6/10 lookups | Aggregate reports requested (rua) | Not checked | Unknown (no known selector) | Not checkedNot checked | 2026-10-18 22:03 UTC |
Records and check detailsPublished records- DMARC (_dmarc.instagram.com)
- v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:…@dmarc.facebookmail.com; pct=100
- SPF (instagram.com)
- v=spf1 include:facebookmail.com include:_spf.fb.com -all
- MX (instagram.com)
- Not checked
- DKIM
- Unknown (no known selector). DKIM use requires a known selector or message to assess; a published key alone cannot confirm signing, and no key at the probed common selectors proves nothing.
- MTA-STS (_mta-sts.instagram.com)
- Not checked
- TLS-RPT (_smtp._tls.instagram.com)
- Not checked
Interpretation- p=reject: receivers are asked to reject failing mail.
- Relaxed DKIM alignment (default).
- Relaxed SPF alignment (default).
- pct=100 is a legacy tag removed by RFC 9989; its effect is receiver-dependent.
- -all: unlisted hosts fail SPF.
- 6 DNS-querying terms (include, a, mx, ptr, exists, redirect), counted recursively; the limit is 10.
- Checked with an earlier assessment that did not validate IP mechanism syntax or resolve a/mx/exists targets; it is re-assessed on the next check.
Observations- Reporting: external destination dmarc.facebookmail.com does not publish report authorization; this affects reporting, not enforcement.
DMARC discovery (RFC 9989 tree walk)- _dmarc.instagram.com: ok, 1 DMARC record
Recent checks- 2026-10-18 22:03 UTC: DMARC reject; SPF -all
Assessment posture-v1. DNS lookup failures leave the policy unknown. |
| whatsapp.com | subsidiaryReviewed 2026-10-18 | DomainSpoof directory (seed) | reject | Direct | -all · 6/10 lookups | Aggregate reports requested (rua) | Not checked | Unknown (no known selector) | Not checkedNot checked | 2026-10-18 22:03 UTC |
Records and check detailsPublished records- DMARC (_dmarc.whatsapp.com)
- v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:…@dmarc.facebookmail.com; pct=100
- SPF (whatsapp.com)
- v=spf1 include:_spf.fb.com include:facebookmail.com -all
- MX (whatsapp.com)
- Not checked
- DKIM
- Unknown (no known selector). DKIM use requires a known selector or message to assess; a published key alone cannot confirm signing, and no key at the probed common selectors proves nothing.
- MTA-STS (_mta-sts.whatsapp.com)
- Not checked
- TLS-RPT (_smtp._tls.whatsapp.com)
- Not checked
Interpretation- p=reject: receivers are asked to reject failing mail.
- Relaxed DKIM alignment (default).
- Relaxed SPF alignment (default).
- pct=100 is a legacy tag removed by RFC 9989; its effect is receiver-dependent.
- -all: unlisted hosts fail SPF.
- 6 DNS-querying terms (include, a, mx, ptr, exists, redirect), counted recursively; the limit is 10.
- Checked with an earlier assessment that did not validate IP mechanism syntax or resolve a/mx/exists targets; it is re-assessed on the next check.
Observations- Reporting: external destination dmarc.facebookmail.com does not publish report authorization; this affects reporting, not enforcement.
DMARC discovery (RFC 9989 tree walk)- _dmarc.whatsapp.com: ok, 1 DMARC record
Recent checks- 2026-10-18 22:03 UTC: DMARC reject; SPF -all
Assessment posture-v1. DNS lookup failures leave the policy unknown. |